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ABSTRACT 
 
 
THE EFFECT OF REGULATORY PRESSURES ON EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
BEHAVIOR OF NONPROFIT HOSPITALS 
 
BY 
 
BRIAN ADAM VANSANT 
 
April 23, 2011 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. R. Lynn Hannan 
 
Major Academic Unit: Accounting 
 
 
My study examines the effect of regulatory pressures on the earnings management behavior of 
nonprofit (i.e., tax-exempt) hospitals. Prior research provides evidence that managers of 
nonprofit hospitals manage reported earnings to a range just above zero profit in order to 
conform to regulator low or zero profit expectations. I extend this research by investigating how 
reported performance on another accounting measure important to regulators, (i.e., charity care), 
further explains the earnings management behavior of nonprofit hospitals. Specifically, I develop 
theory to predict that nonprofit hospitals use discretionary accruals to manage positive earnings 
toward regulator low profit expectations less aggressively when reported performance on charity 
care is higher than regulator expectations. The intuition behind this prediction is that nonprofit 
hospital managers can benefit from reporting higher earnings (from profit-based compensation 
and/or enhanced reputations for operational efficiency), however, they must balance this against 
the costs of regulatory scrutiny. Results are consistent with my prediction. Further, I validate that 
my results are not alternatively explained by the mechanical relationship of my test variables, the 
general hospital economic environment, and/or the specific reporting environment of my sample 
firms. I do so by comparing the earnings management behavior of nonprofit hospitals to that of 
for-profit hospitals. Overall, results suggest that nonprofit managers strategically manage 
earnings higher when their firms are less vulnerable to regulator scrutiny of their reported chairy 
care. As such, my study contributes to the earnings management literature and has policy 
implications important to regulators, especially given the current U.S. healthcare environment. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The healthcare industry in the United States is characterized by a mix of both nonprofit 
and for-profit hospitals. In response to widespread pressures to decrease health care costs, 
hospitals have focused on efficiency enhancement, resulting in almost identical operational 
behavior between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals (Singer, 1997). Nevertheless, one key 
difference between these two types of organizations still exists; nonprofit hospitals are exempt 
from paying most federal, state, and local taxes. In 2002, the Federal Joint Committee on 
Taxation estimated that nonprofit hospital tax exemptions represent a total of $12.6 billion 
annually in lost tax revenues. The similarity of nonprofit hospital operational behavior to that of 
for-profit hospitals, together with the economic significance of nonprofit hospital tax 
exemptions, has led policymakers to strongly question whether the tax advantages nonprofit 
hospitals receive are appropriate. Accordingly, tax regulators have imposed pressure - via 
mandatory reporting requirements and heightened scrutiny of reported performance - on 
nonprofit hospitals to justify their current tax exemptions under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code (Wood, 2001; Appleby, 2004).   
My study examines the effect of regulatory pressures on the earnings management 
behavior of nonprofit hospitals. In return for their tax exemptions, nonprofit hospitals are 
expected by policymakers and tax regulators to report near zero long-run economic profits and 
spend excess operating profits on the provision of free or discounted medical services to the poor 
in their communities (hereafter referred to as “charity care”). Two factors underlie these 
expectations. First, nonprofit organizations, by definition, are meant to provide services that are 
inherently unprofitable for private enterprise. Second, due to the absence of a residual claimant, 
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nonprofits are expected to recycle any surplus into the provison of services for the communities 
that they are designed to serve. Higher reported earnings performance can open nonprofit 
hospitals to greater regulatory scrutiny and potentially the loss of their tax exemptions. 
Therefore, nonprofit hospitals have an incentive to report accounting earnings in a range just 
above zero profit to conform to regulator low or zero profit expectations (also referred to in this 
paper as “low profit constraints”). 
Consistent with this argument, prior accounting research provides evidence that nonprofit 
hospitals manage their earnings to a range just above zero profit via discretionary accruals 
(Leone and Van Horn, 2005) and real activities (Eldenburg et al., 2008). However, there is also 
evidence suggesting that, in addition to their focus on reported earnings, regulators‟ assessments 
of nonprofit hospital tax exemptions are sensitive to reported levels of charity care provided by 
hospitals (Wilicki, 2001; Barniv et al., 2005). Regulators may expect a certain level of charity 
from a particular hospital based on other observable factors affecting the hospital‟s ability to 
provide charity care (e.g., hospital size and capacity, demand for charity care in the hospital‟s 
geographic market). I investigate whether reported levels of charity care that are higher than 
regulator expectations are perceived by nonprofit hospital managers as providing slack in terms 
of conformance to regulator low profit constraints.   
Managing earnings towards zero may enable nonprofits to reduce the likelihood of 
regulatory scrutiny, providing incentives for earnings management behavior. However, an 
opposing force arises from nonprofit managers‟ compensation systems. Prior research finds that 
nonprofit hospitals often compensate their executive managers based on accounting measures of 
profitability (Lambert and Larcker, 1995; Brickley and Van Horn, 2002) and that managers of 
nonprofit hospitals are just as responsive to financial incentives as their counterparts in for-profit 
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hospitals (Duggan, 2000). Drawing on extant research, I develop theory to predict that managers 
of nonprofit hospitals manage positive earnings downward toward regulator low profit 
constraints less aggressively when contemporaneously reporting charity care that exceeds 
regulator expectations. The intuition behind this prediction is that managers can benefit from 
reporting higher earnings (via higher profit-based compensation and/or reputations for 
operational efficiency), however, they must weigh these benefits against the costs of regulatory 
scrutiny.   
To test my prediction empirically, I use data reported during years 2002-2008 by 
nonprofit hospitals to a state regulatory agency (i.e., a State of California regulatory agency) that 
has mandatory reporting requirements including the reporting of charity care. Before testing my 
formal hypothesis, I first test whether, ceteris paribus, nonprofit hospitals tend to manage 
earnings to a range just above zero profit. Consistent with my expectation and with prior research 
(Leone and Van Horn, 2005; Eldenburg et al., 2008), I observe a discontinuity around zero profit 
in the earnings distribution of my sample of nonprofit hospitals. Specifically, I find an 
abnormally high number of nonprofit hospital firms reporting return on assets (ROA) within the 
range of 0 to 4 percent. I then estimate a discretionary accruals model, adapted from Leone and 
Van Horn (2005), that uses a liability account specific to the hospital industry as the dependant 
variable (i.e., third-party settlement liability account). Consistent with Leone and Van Horn 
(2005), I test for earnings management and find a negative relationship between earnings before 
discretionary accruals (i.e., pre-managed earnings) and discretionary accruals. Taken together, 
these findings are antecedent to and consistent with my central argument - that nonprofit hospital 
managers are motivated to manage earnings to a point above zero that maximizes firm surpluses 
and their personal benefits without jeopardizing the tax-exempt status of their hospital.   
13 
 
I then develop a model to estimate the extent that a nonprofit hospital‟s reported charity 
care deviates from regulator expectations. This measure serves as a proxy for a firm‟s sensitivity 
to regulatory scrutiny of their reported level of charity care. I use this measure to formally test 
my prediction that managers less aggressively manage positive earnings downward toward 
regulator low profit constraints when their reported charity care levels are higher than regulator 
expectations. I find a positive association between discretionary accruals and reported charity 
care levels that exceed regulator expectations. Further, I find the negative association between 
pre-managed earnings and discretionary accruals is moderated by higher than regulator-expected 
levels of charity care. These results support my prediction and suggest that nonprofit managers 
strategically use earnings management to report higher earnings when their firm is less 
vulnerable to regulatory scrutiny. 
I also perform a supplemental analysis to rule out possible alternative explanations for 
my results. While the results support my theory and hypothesis, the results could possibly be 
explained by the mechanical relationship between the variables included in my empirical models 
and/or explained by factors related to the general business and reporting environment of my 
nonprofit hospital sample. I perform additional tests to investigate this by comparing the earnings 
management behaviors of nonprofit hospitals to those of for-profit hospitals operating in the 
same environment during the same time period. I posit that the nonprofit hospital reporting 
objective for accounting is more defined and homogeneous than that of for-profit hospitals. 
Specifically, I argue that the objective of a nonprofit hospital manager is to report earnings 
within a range close to a single benchmark (i.e., zero profit) depending on whether their reported 
level of charity care is consistent with regulator expectations. In contrast, given that for-profit 
hospitals receive no tax exemptions, I expect that managers of for-profit hospitals are not under 
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significant regulatory pressure to report near zero profits or provide a certain level of charity 
care. Consistent with this expectation, and in contrast to my results for nonprofit hospitals, I find 
evidence that for-profit hospital managers‟ decisions to manage earnings toward zero profit do 
not depend on their conformance with regulator expectations regarding charity care. Based on 
this result, I conclude that the nonprofit sample results are more likely explained by my theory 
than by factors related to the mechanical relationship between the accounting variables included 
in my empirical tests, and/or the hospital business and reporting environment for hospitals in 
California.  
My study is important for several reasons. First, I contribute to the economics-based 
literature stream that examines the effects of various stakeholder pressures on nonprofit 
operational and reporting decisions (e.g., Jegers and Houtman, 1993; Eldenburg and Krishnan, 
2003, 2008; Eldenburg and Vines, 2004; Krishnan, 2005; Leone and Van Horn 2005; Krishnan 
and Yetman, 2009). Recent studies suggest nonprofit hospitals manage earnings to report profits 
consistent with regulator low profit constraints (Leone and Van Horn, 2005; Eldenburg et al., 
2008). I extend these studies by investigating how reported performance on an accounting 
measure important to regulators, (i.e., charity care), further explains the earnings management 
behavior of nonprofit hospitals. My study suggests that, when multiple measures of performance 
are important to stakeholders, nonprofit managers make strategic reporting decisions to conform 
with stakeholder expectations while also maximizing firm surpluses and their personal benefits.  
Second, I contribute to prior research that investigates how political and regulatory cost 
incentives influence firm decisions to manage accounting measures. The positive accounting 
literature provides evidence that firms make income-decreasing accounting choices when 
subjected to political scrutiny and the threat of unfavorable regulation (e.g., Jones, 1991; Cahan, 
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1992; Mensah et al., 1994; Key, 1997; Patten and Trompeter, 2003). I extend this literature by 
providing evidence that firms threatened by political and regulatory costs may manage earnings 
downward less aggressively when they believe policymaker and regulator expectations have 
been exceeded on other reported measures.  
Third, my study has implications relevant to the debate over whether nonprofit hospital 
behavior is consistent with the expectations of policymakers and regulators. My results suggest 
that managers of nonprofit hospitals believe regulatory pressures to report near zero profits 
depend on reported levels of charity care, resulting in strategic earnings management to 
maximize their personal benefits when reported charity care exceeds regulator expectations. This 
could result in regulators basing their tax exemption decisions on misleading accounting reports.  
   The remainder of my study is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the regulatory 
environment for nonprofit hospitals, nonprofit hospital manager reporting incentives, and prior 
research on nonprofit hospital earnings management to develop my theory and  hypothesis. 
Section 3 describes the regulatory and reporting environment in California, my sample selection 
methodology, and reports summary financial data for the selected nonprofit hospital sample 
population. Section 4 discusses my research design and develops my empirical model.  Section 5 
reports and discusses my empirical results. Section 6 concludes and discusses the implications of 
my study to academic research and regulatory policy. 
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CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
 
Regulator Low Profit Constraints and Manager Reporting Incentives 
The basic objective function of a nonprofit entity is to maximize the quantity and quality 
of the services it provides to its constituents, subject to a long-run economic zero profit 
constraint (e.g., Newhouse, 1970; Pauley, 1977; Hoerger, 1991). Nonprofit firms are granted tax-
exempt status under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code based on their stated 
missions to operate consistent with this objective function. To maintain their tax exemptions, 
regulators expect that nonprofit firms will operate close to breakeven, consistent with reported 
accounting earnings within a range close to a zero profit (i.e., low profit). Nonprofit firms 
reporting higher earnings could be perceived as straying from their missions and are, therefore, 
more likely to face regulatory scrutiny and potential loss of their tax-exempt status. Since the 
regulatory investigation process and loss of tax exemption can represent significant economic 
costs to a nonprofit firm, managers have incentives to avoid these costs. Therefore, nonprofit 
managers are likely motivated to manage accounting earnings towards a zero profit to conform to 
regulator low profit constraints and avoid scrutiny. Consistent with this prediction, prior studies 
provide evidence of firms (both nonprofit and for-profit) making income-decreasing abnormal 
accruals in response to regulatory pressure and political scrutiny (e.g., Jones, 1991; Cahan, 1992; 
Key, 1997; Leone and Van Horn, 2005; Eldenburg et al., 2008). 
Managing earnings towards zero enables avoidance of regulatory scrutiny. However, if 
nonprofit managers are compensated based on accounting measures of profitability (i.e., bonuses 
and salary raises based on profits), they have opposing incentives to report higher earnings. 
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While federal tax regulations (Internal Revenue Code 4958) prohibit the payment of excessive 
compensation to executives of nonprofit firms, nonprofits are allowed to compensate managers 
based on measures of profit (see Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 1984 memorandum GC 
38283).
1
  
In 1983 Medicare changed from cost-based to flat-fee (by patient diagnosis) 
reimbursement of hospitals. As a result, the U.S. hospital operating environment became riskier 
(Eldenburg et al., 2009). As such, there was a subsequent shift among nonprofit hospitals 
towards profit-based compensation for executive managers to attract and retain talented hospital 
managers and compete for labor with for-profit hospitals. Lambert and Larcker (1995) provide 
evidence of this shift and Brickley and Van Horn (2002, p.229) find that nonprofit hospital 
“CEO turnover [rates] and annual compensation are strongly related to financial performance (as 
measured by return on assets)…and no evidence that [nonprofit hospitals] provide explicit 
incentives for their CEOs to focus on altruistic activities.” Further, Duggan (2000) finds that 
nonprofit hospital managers are just as responsive to financial incentives as their counterparts in 
for-profit hospitals.  
Specific to the compensation practices of the nonprofit hospitals in my sample (i.e., 
California nonprofit hospitals during the period 2002 - 2008), Eldenburg and Krishnan (2008) 
find that during the period 1990 - 2002 both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals in California used 
managerial bonuses tied to financial performance. Therefore, I assume the nonprofit hospital 
managers in my sample receive incentive compensation consistent with that observed during the 
time period immediately preceding my sample period by Eldenburg and Krishnan. Traditional 
economic theory predicts that such managers have incentives to manage accounting earnings 
                                                 
1
 The IRS ruled in 1994 that compensation of nonprofit managers would not be considered “excessive” as long as 
the total compensation of an individual was within a range of pay for similar services by comparable organizations. 
18 
 
upward to maximize their personal compensation and signal their ability to efficiently operate 
and manage their hospitals.   
To summarize, nonprofit hospital managers are faced with two conflicting incentives; 1) 
reporting lower profits to avoid regulatory costs that could damage their firms‟ reputations, and 
2) reporting higher profits to maximize personal benefits in the form of bonuses, salary raises, 
and their reputations for operational efficiency.   
 
Regulator Scrutiny and Expectations for Charity Care 
 
While conformance to regulatory low profit constraints is an important goal for 
maintaining tax-exempt status, reported levels of charity care are also likely to influence tax 
regulator decisions. Despite little scrutiny of charity care levels by federal regulators, an increase 
in state regulatory pressures warrant nonprofit hospital concern about the future of their tax 
exemptions if their reported charity care is below regulatory expectations (Burns, 2004). Armed 
with evidence of converging operational behavior between nonprofit hospitals and for-profit 
hospitals, state regulatory authorities have increasingly scrutinized reported levels of charity care 
and disputed nonprofit hospital tax exemptions (Appleby, 2004; Barniv et al., 2005).   
Regulatory expectations that nonprofit hospitals operate at a long-run zero profit and 
provide charity care were first established at the federal level in a 1956 IRS Revenue Ruling 
(IRS Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202). Subsequent IRS Rulings in 1969 and 1983 relaxed the 
focus on charity care and suggested that hospitals are exempt from taxes as long as they provide 
benefits to the community and do not deny emergency care to those unable to pay.
2
 Until 2010, 
the IRS did not require nonprofit hospitals to quantify and report charity care and was not 
                                                 
2
 See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117, 118 and Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94, 95. 
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particularly aggressive in their scrutiny of nonprofit hospital tax-exemptions.
3
 Therefore, states 
passed their own laws and reporting requirements so they could challenge nonprofit hospital tax 
exemptions based on both reported earnings and charity care performance (Wood, 2001). 
As of 2008, ten states - including California - have laws requiring hospitals to annually 
quantify and report charity care along with a balance sheet and income statement. Accordingly, 
regulatory scrutiny and resulting litigation to revoke tax exemptions usually originates from state 
attorney general offices (Burns, 2004; Leone and Van Horn, 2005).
4
 Hospital industry observers 
consider this increase in state regulatory oversight and scrutiny as a real and increasing threat to 
the future of nonprofit hospital tax exemptions (Weissentein, 1997). 
Consistent with the importance many state governments have placed on charity care, 
prior academic research provides evidence that the level of charity care reported by nonprofit 
hospitals influence regulatory scrutiny and potential revocation of tax exemption. In an 
experimental setting, Wilicki (2001) finds that when the amount of charity care provided by a 
hospital is low, higher profits leads subjects (tax accountants and tax attorneys) to judge a 
nonprofit hospital as more likely to lose tax-exempt status. Consistent with Wilicki‟s 
experimental results, Barniv et al. (2005) use a national sample of archival data to show that the 
level of charity care reported by nonprofit hospitals is negatively related to the likelihood of 
revocation of state and local tax exemption. These results suggest nonprofit hospitals may be 
under less (more) regulatory pressure to report earnings that conform with regulator low profit 
                                                 
3
 Effective in 2010, the IRS requires that nonprofit hospitals annually report their levels of charity care in a new 
schedule (Schedule H) as part of their IRS Form 990 tax reports. 
4
 For example:  in 1985 the Utah Supreme Court revoked the tax-exempt status of Intermountain Health Care 
because it failed to provide an adequate level of charity care or other community benefits. In 1996 a case filed in the 
State of Pennsylvania by state regulators (Hospital Utilization Project v. Commonwealth) resulted in state and local 
municipalities challenging the tax-exempt status of over 79% of nonprofit hospital hospitals operating in the state. In 
2004 the Illinois Department of Revenue revoked the tax-exempt status of Provena Covenant Medical Center based 
on claims made by tax authorities that the hospital was not operating like a charitable institution.  
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constraints when their reported level of charity care is higher (lower) than regulatory 
expectations. 
 
Prior Literature on Nonprofit Hospital Earnings Management Behavior 
Because regulatory pressure constrains nonprofit firms‟ earnings, the incentives to 
manage earnings are fundamentally different from those in the for-profit sector. Prior research 
finds that publicly-traded firms manage earnings to avoid current year losses, show a positive 
trend in earnings, smooth income, and meet or beat analyst forecasts (e.g., Burgstahler and 
Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 1999). In contrast, nonprofit firms are likely to be focused on 
meeting just one earnings benchmark, a zero or slightly above zero profit that conforms to 
regulator low profit constraints. Consistent with this view, Hoergar (1991) finds that nonprofit 
hospitals report less earnings variance than for-profit hospitals, and Leone and Van Horn (2005) 
find that nonprofit hospitals manage reported earnings to a range just above zero profit. Leone 
and Van Horn interpret their results as evidence that part of the difference in earnings variability 
between nonprofit hospitals and for-profit hospitals is due to nonprofit hospital managers using 
discretionary accruals to manage earnings to a range that conforms to regulatory low profit 
constraints while also signaling the managers‟ abilities to manage efficiently. Corroborating the 
Leone and Van Horn results, Eldenburg et al. (2008) also find, using a different sample, a 
discontinuity around zero profit in an earnings distribution of nonprofit hospitals and evidence of 
nonprofit hospitals using real activities to manage earnings.
5
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Management of real activities is also referred to in the academic literature as real earnings management.  I use 
these terms interchangeably in the text. 
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CHAPTER III 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Prior studies provide evidence that nonprofit hospitals often compensate executive 
managers based on accounting measures of profitability (e.g., Lambert and Larcker, 1995; 
Brickley and Van Horn, 2002). Therefore, managers of nonprofit hospitals have incentives to 
make discretionary accounting and reporting decisions (i.e., earnings management decisions) to 
report higher accounting earnings. However, nonprofit hospital managers must balance the 
benefits associated with reporting higher earnings with the potential costs of regulatory scrutiny. 
To the extent nonprofit hospital managers believe regulatory scrutiny and tax exemption 
decisions are sensitive to both their reported earnings and their reported charity care, their 
perceptions of the net benefits from engaging in income-increasing earnings management (or less 
aggressive income-decreasing earnings management) behavior likely depends on the extent that 
reported charity care meets or exceeds regulator expectations. Therefore, nonprofit hospitals‟ 
discretionary accruals are likely based not only on the relation of earnings before discretionary 
accruals to a low profit constraint, but also on the relation of reported charity care to regulator 
expectations of charity care. In other words, nonprofit hospital managers‟ discretionary accrual 
decisions to manage positive earnings toward zero profit should depend on the extent they 
perceive their reported charity care deviates from regulator expectations. This leads to the 
following hypothesis (stated in the alternative):  
H1: Managers of nonprofit hospitals use discretionary accruals to manage positive earnings 
toward zero profit less (more) aggressively when their contemporaneously reported 
charity care is higher (lower) than regulator expectations.  
 
It is reasonable to assume that regulators in states with mandatory and specific reporting 
requirements for charity care are more likely to scrutinize nonprofit hospitals who report charity 
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care below regulator expectations. As such, I use data from one of these states, California, to 
empirically test my hypothesis. I discuss the reporting requirements and regulatory environment 
of California in the following section. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SAMPLE DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
California Hospital Data and Sample Selection 
Consistent with prior accounting studies (e.g., Krishnan, 2005; Eldenburg and Krishnan, 
2003, 2008; Eldenburg et al., 2009), my sample data is from hospitals registered and operating in 
California. I choose California hospitals because the state‟s Office of Statewide Health Planning 
and Development (OSHPD) collects detailed financial data (including a line item for charity 
care) on all registered hospitals within the state and requires that all reported data reconcile with 
hospitals‟ financial statements prepared in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP). The OSHPD website states that all hospital reports undergo a desk audit and 
the California Health and Human Services Agency engages the State Department of Health 
Services to perform on-site reviews of all California hospitals to validate each hospitals reported 
data (Krishnan and Yetman, 2009).   
Furthermore, and importantly, I choose the OSHPD data for my study because the 
policymakers and regulators in California appear to consider reported levels of charity care 
important. In 1993, a bill was proposed in the California state legislature to tax nonprofit 
hospitals based on any profits earned in excess of reported charity care (Burda, 1994). While this 
measure ultimately failed, a statute was enacted (effective 1997) requiring all hospitals to draft a 
“community benefits plan,” which, along with other types of community benefits, includes the 
provision of charity care.
6
 These events suggest that regulators in California are likely to 
scrutinize nonprofit hospitals reporting deficient levels of charity care. 
                                                 
6
 See California Health & Safety Code §§ 127340-127365 
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The sample data include firm years 2002-2008. Consistent with prior studies (e.g., 
Eldenburg et al., 2008; Krishnan and Yetman, 2009), I define a nonprofit hospital as a hospital 
that is a registered nonprofit entity under IRS 501(c)(3), is operated by a private non-profit 
corporation or church, and is not considered by the OSHPD as a “non-private” (i.e., a 
community, state, or federal government run facility). Non-private hospitals are excluded from 
my sample because some of the funding for these entities comes from local, state, and/or federal 
municipalities. Therefore, managers of these non-private entities likely have different objective 
functions regarding profitability than nonprofit hospitals funded predominately through patient 
revenue, church funding, and/or private donations (Eldenburg and Krishnan, 2003).   
While my hypothesis is only related to the earnings management behavior of nonprofit 
hospitals, I also select a sample of for-profit hospitals for the same years, 2002-2008, to conduct 
a supplemental analysis comparing the earnings management behavior of nonprofit hospitals to 
that of for-profit hospitals. The supplemental analysis is performed to validate that my results for 
nonprofit hospitals are not alternatively explained by the general nature of the California hospital 
business and/or the OSHPD reporting environment. I define for-profit hospitals as those labeled 
as investor owned. According to the OSHPD, these hospitals are owned by shareholders, pay 
state and local taxes, and are either publicly-traded or owned by a private investor group.  
I exclude from both nonprofit hospital and for-profit hospital samples substance abuse, 
long-term nursing care, and psychiatric hospitals because the production function and patient 
mix for these types of hospitals differ from that of the acute care general hospitals I include in 
my sample (Eldenburg et al., 2008). I also exclude hospitals that are part of the Kaiser 
Foundation or registered as Shriner hospitals because the OSHPD database does not list them as 
comparable to other nonprofits given their unique funding mechanisms and service missions. 
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After all exluded hospital types, the remaining sample includes 150 nonprofit hospitals and 75 
for-profit hospitals, resulting in a total of 1,063 (544) firm years for the nonprofit (for-profit) 
sample.  
 
Sample Descriptive Statistics for Nonprofit Sample 
 A summary of key financial data for my sample of nonprofit hospital firms is reported in 
Table 1.  The average total gross revenue is $711 million and the average net revenue is $197 
million. The large difference ($514 million) between average gross and average net revenues 
results from significant amounts of “deductions from revenues,” which include the provision for 
bad debts, contractual adjustments (discussed in Section 4.1), and charity care. While charity 
care on average accounts for $10 million of these deductions, the majority of these deductions 
are for contractual adjustments. The sample firms‟ average total assets are $232 million. 
 
TABLE 1 
Key Financial Measures 
Nonprofit Hospital Sample (n=1,063 firm years) 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 25
th
 Percentile 50
th
 Percentile 75
th
 Percentile 
 
Total Gross Revenue 
       
710,633,917  
        
750,075,222  
         
215,511,769  
        
529,393,630  
       
936,937,187  
 
Charity Care 
       
  10,311,031  
          
16,712,213  
             
1,316,544  
            
4,553,153  
         
11,328,711  
 
Net Total Gross Revenue 
       
197,109,721  
        
214,431,688  
           
63,628,456  
        
137,358,677  
       
249,723,727  
 
Net Income 
         
11,825,993  
          
27,645,199  
              
(309,818) 
            
4,310,166  
         
15,352,438  
 
Cash 
         
13,261,710  
          
30,001,844  
                
314,000  
            
2,924,068  
         
12,946,038  
 
Total Assets 
       
231,810,707  
        
311,946,769  
           
48,213,988  
        
123,644,830  
       
283,882,310  
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CHAPTER V 
RESEARCH VARIABLES AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
 
Discretionary Accruals and the Third-Party Settlement Liability Account 
A considerable stream of accounting and finance research finds evidence that 
discretionary accruals are the primary vehicle used by firms to manage reported accounting 
earnings to “window-dress” financial statements made publicly available to stakeholders.7 The 
majority of these researchers estimate discretionary accruals using models that include 
aggregated measures of assets and liabilities, such as the Jones (1991) model. However, some 
researchers identify specific financial statement accounts that require considerable managerial 
judgment and are suspected to be used to manage earnings in a particular setting or industry. 
Using a model adapted from Leone and Van Horn (2005), I follow the second approach and 
estimate discretionary accruals using a specific liability account common to the hospital industry, 
the “third-party payer settlement liability account” (TPA account). 8  Leone and Van Horn also 
estimate discretionary accruals using the Jones (1991) model and conclude that the TPA account 
specific model appears to remove a larger portion of the non-discretionary component of 
accruals and is more reliable. 
TPAs for hospitals represent the expected difference between gross billed (both paid and 
unpaid) claims sent to third-party payers
9
 and management estimates of expected contractual 
adjustments to the claims made by third-party payers. For example, inpatient hospital services 
                                                 
7
 See Healy and Wahlen (1999) for a review of this literature.   
8
 Alternatively, another “account specific model” could use adjustments made by hospitals to their “Provision for 
Bad Debt” accounts to estimate discretionary accruals. Leone and Van Horn (2005) estimated discretionary accruals 
using both changes to TPA and Provision for Bad Debt and find the estimations yield similar results in their test of 
earnings management by nonprofit hospitals around a zero profit.  
9
 Third-party payers include insurance companies, government payers, and/or other non-patient, third-party payers. 
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are billed to third parties based on a payment system known as Diagnostic Related Groups 
(DRGs) which relies on the patient‟s diagnosis at discharge. The actual payment received from 
the third-party payer is subject to adjustments to the gross DRG rate initially billed by the 
hospital. These adjustments are based on contractual agreements (that are usually very complex) 
between the hospital and the third-party payer. Third-party payers and hospitals are often in 
disagreement over the appropriate charges based on their different interpretations of the 
contractual agreement. Furthermore, the initial payments made by third-party payers are often 
later adjusted as a result of claim audits performed by the third-party payer (Leone and Van 
Horn, 2005). Therefore, to appropriately adhere to accrual based accounting, management to 
estimates the difference between the initial gross charges and the final settled-upon payment for 
all provided and billed medical services during an applicable reporting year. This estimation is 
recorded as a current year deduction from revenue (i.e., contractual adjustments) and as a 
liability (i.e., TPA).   
The TPA liability can be substantial in relation to a hospital‟s total liabilities and period 
changes in this account can significantly affect a hospital‟s reported earnings. Further, this 
account is considered by independent auditors as the account in the hospital industry most 
susceptible to earnings management because it is difficult to audit given the considerable 
subjective judgment involved in its estimation (Leone and Van Horn, 2005).
10
 The American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) has also indicated concern over hospitals 
managing earnings via the TPA account. In fact, the AICPA has published a case study to raise 
awareness of the ethical issues related to the valuation of the TPA account. Given its materiality 
and the noted concerns by independent auditors and the AICPA, it is reasonable to assume that 
                                                 
10
 Leone and Van Horn (2005) also note that several hospital CFOs verify that manipulation of the TPA account 
does occur in practice.   
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nonprofit hospital managers are likely to bias their estimations of this liability to manage 
earnings. 
Accordingly, I use the following model (adapted from Leone and Van Horn, 2005) to 
estimate discretionary accruals (DAT) using the TPA account for my dependent variable, where 
DATit is equal to the residual for hospital i in year t: 
∆TPAit = α0t + α1∆TGRit + α2∆GRMEDit + εit    (1) 
where all variables are scaled by total assets in year t-1. The dependent variable, ∆TPAit, is the 
change in TPA for hospital i in year t. TPA is not reported as a separate line item on the balance 
sheet, however, a contra-revenue account labeled  “Contractual Adjustments” reflects the effect 
on income of any adjustments made to the liability account. Assuming that the nature of 
contractual adjustments between a hospital and its third-party payers remains relatively similar 
from year to year, the current year contractual adjustments account should be approximately 
equal to the prior year‟s amount, plus or minus the current year change in undiscounted gross 
revenue (based on Diagnostic Related Group billed rates) from the prior year. Therefore, I use 
the change in the contractual adjustments account in year t from year t-1 (i.e., = Contractual 
Adjustments in year t minus Contractual Adjustments in year t-1) consistent with Leone and Van 
Horn (2005). The independent variable ∆TGRit is the change in total gross billed revenue from 
the prior year. The independent variable ∆GRMEDit is the change in gross billed Medi-Care and 
Medi-Cal revenue, and included as a control because the likelihood of payment and contractual 
adjustments from government payers are often different from that of insurance companies and 
other third-party payers (Eldenburg et al., 2008; Leone and Van Horn, 2005).
11
 
 
                                                 
11
 Note that while I do define model variables throughout the text, I also include a comprehensive list of all model 
variables and their definitions in the appendix. 
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Test of Earnings Management around Zero Profit 
Prior research (Leone and Van Horn, 2005; Eldenburg et al., 2004, 2008) finds a 
discontinuity in the earnings distributions of nonprofit hospital samples around zero profit and a 
negative relation between earnings before discretionary accruals and discretionary accruals. 
These findings support the argument that nonprofit hospitals manage earnings upward to avoid 
negative earnings and downward to conform to regulator low profit constraints. The results 
observed in these prior studies are a necessary antecedant to my prediction in H1, which implies 
that levels of reported charity care relative to regulator expectations will change the 
aggressiveness of earnings management by nonprofit hospitals to report earnings close to zero. 
Therefore, before formally testing my hypothisis (H1), I first replicate the prior study results 
using my sample of nonprofit hospitals. I describe the empirical methodology of the replication 
and the empircal models used in the Results chapter (i.e., Chapter VI). 
 
Charity Care - OSHPD Reporting Requirements and Regulator Expectations 
Charity care represents free or discounted medical services provided by a hospital to 
patients not able to pay. The OSHPD reporting guidelines require hospitals to report all charity 
care services rendered as a deduction from revenue using the appropriate gross DRG billing 
rates. Since the OSHPD also requires that all healthcare services provided (whether charity care 
or not) be reported as gross revenue using DRG billing rates, the effect on total net revenue for 
charity care is zero. While the actual costs incurred by a hospital to provide charity care are part 
of its total expenses reported, these costs are not separately catergorized as charity care. 
Therefore, the only measurement available within the OSHPD reporting database to regulators 
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(regarding a hospital‟s provided charity care) is the reported deduction from revenue valued at 
gross DRG billing rates. 
Consistent with hospital operating and reporting guidelines issued in 1990 by the AICPA, 
the OSHPD requires hospitals to identify patients as recipients of charity care at the time of 
admission based on the hospital‟s assessment of the patient‟s ability to pay the portion of their 
potential gross bill (based on DRG rates) not covered by any third-party payers. Therefore, 
patients not determined as a charity care case at the time of admission who subsequently cannot 
pay their portion of the hospital‟s total billed charges cannot be classified as charity care. 
Instead, the OSHPD requires such cases be reported as bad debt expense. This requirement 
makes it difficult for reported charity care to be manipulated. As such, I assume that reported 
levels of charity care by are relatively accurate and reliable measures of the amount of charity 
care provided. If charity care is not manipulated, then reported amounts should be a function of 
managers‟ strategic-operational decisions based on exogenous factors affecting the demand for 
charity care in their communities and their firms‟ subjective appetites for providing charity care.  
I predict that nonprofit hospitals manage positive earnings (via TPA accruals) toward 
regulator low profit constraints depending on the extent their reported levels of charity care 
deviate from regulator expectations. This implies that higher amounts of reported charity care 
indicate a nonprofit hospital is less likely to be scrutinized by regulators. However, the  level of 
charity care acceptable to regulators likely to depends on both the prior year level of charity care 
reported by a hospital and factors specific to a particular hospital‟s ability to provide charity care. 
Consistent with this view, prior studies provide evidence that the amount of charity care a 
hospital provides is influenced by factors such as a hospital‟s size, total gross inpatient revenue, 
geographical market demand for charity care, and case severity (e.g., Dranove et al., 1993 ; 
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Lynk, 1995 ; Morrisey et al., 1996; Hassan et al., 2000 ; Clement et al., 2002 ; Eldenburg and 
Vines, 2004; Eldenburg et al., 2009).  
 
Charity Care Expectations Model 
Based on the intuition and prior research discussed in the previous section, I develop a 
“Charity Care Expectations Model” (CCE Model) that regresses a hospital‟s current year 
reported charity care on variables that prior research suggests are being associated with charity 
care levels. The residuals (EXPCCit) from this model are then used to proxy for a hospital‟s level 
of charity care that deviates from regulator expectations, where a positive (negative) value 
indicates the extent a hospital‟s reported charity care is above (below) regulator expectations.  
The model is as follows: 
CHARITYit = α0t + α1CHARITY it-1 + α2TRAUit + α3UPi + α4TGRit + εit   (2) 
where: 
CHARITYit is equal to the reported amount of charity care by hospital i in year t scaled by total 
assets in year t-1. 
 
CHARITYit-1 is the reported amount of charity care expense by hospital i in year t-1 scaled by 
total assets in year t-2. I include prior year reported charity care for a hospital prior year because 
it is likely a baseline considered by regulators when forming an expectation about a hospital‟s 
current year reported charity care. 
 
TRAUit is a proxy for case severity and is equal to 1 if the OSHPD considers hospital i in year t a 
hospital with the facilities and personnel to provide care for emergency trauma related injuries. 
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Hospital charges for trauma related injuries are disproportionally expensive and prior research 
finds a positive association between charity care levels and whether a hospital provides trauma 
care (Norton and Staiger, 1994). This is because trauma related injuries often result in more 
expensive hospital bills and, therefore, hospitals that treat trauma patients are more likely to have 
patients who have large bills and, therefore, more likely to qualify for charity care.  
 
UPi is a proxy for a hospital‟s geographical market demand for charity care and is equal to the 
percent of the population that was uninsured in the Health Service Area
12
 (HSA) where hospital i 
is located. Since charity care is reported the the OSHPD based on gross charges less any amounts 
recoverable from third-party payers, regulators are likely to expect greater levels of charity care 
by hospitals in areas with larger proportions of individuals bearing greater amounts of their 
hospital charges. This variable is not likely to be a statistically significant predictor of reported 
charity care in my model given the variable CHARITYit-1 (i.e., a hospital‟s prior year reported 
charity care) is also in the model. Prior year charity care likely captures a hospital‟s historical 
demand for charity.  Nevertheless, I include UP in the model as a control variable for any 
demand for charity care not captured by CHARITYit-1. 
 
TGRit is equal to the reported amount of total gross revenue by hospital i in year t scaled by total 
assets in year t-1. I include this variable given that charity care is reported to the OSHPD based 
on gross revenue rates for the medical services provided to patients deemed by hospitals as 
                                                 
12
 A Health Service Areas (HSA) is defined by the National Center for Health Statistics, part of the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, to be a single county or cluster of contiguous counties which are relatively self-
contained with respect to hospital care.  The resident population of a particular HSA where a specific hospital is 
located approximates a hospital‟s “patient market.” Population data regarding the percent of residents uninsured and 
percent of residents below poverty is not compiled by HSA every calendar year. I use data compiled in 2006, as this 
is a year included in my sample period. 
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charity care cases. Therefore, the comparison by regulators of reported charity care to total gross 
revenue is  a natural way to common size reported charity care among different hospitals. 
 
Test of Reported Charity Care Effects on Earnings Management 
H1 formally states my prediction regarding the effect of contemporaneously reported 
levels of charity care on nonprofit hospital earnings management behavior. My hypothesis is 
based on the intuition that managers will assess the potential regulatory scrutiny for higher 
reported earnings depending on their perceptions of potential regulator scrutiny resulting from 
their reported level of charity care. Specifically, I predict that managers of nonprofit hospital 
firms use discretionary accruals to manage positive earnings downward toward zero profit less 
(more) aggressively when their contemporaneously reported charity care is higher (lower) than 
regulator expectations.  Equation (3) below incorporates into the equation used to test for 
earnings management by prior studies (this equation is described in footnote 11) the extent a 
nonprofit hospitals reported charity care is below or above the regulator expectations. 
DATit = λ0t + λ1EBDAit + λ2ROAit -1 +  λ3DATit -1 + λ4EXPCCit + 
 λ5EXPCCit* EBDAit + εit       (3) 
where, DATit is discretionary accruals estimated in Equation (1) for hospital i in period t scaled 
by total assets in period t-1, EBDAit is net income before discretionary accruals for hospital i in 
period t scaled by total assets in period t-1, ROAit -1 is net income for hospital i in period t-1 
scaled by total assets at the end of period t-2, DATit -1 is included to control for the first-order 
autocorrelation in discretionary accruals, and EXPCCit  proxies for extent charity care reported 
by hospital i in year t is either above or below regulator expectations and is equal to the residual 
for hospital i in year t from a regression of the CCE model (i.e., Equation 2) 
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CHAPTER VI 
RESULTS 
 
Earnings Management around Zero Profit 
If nonprofit hospital managers use discretionary accruals to report lower positive earnings 
to conform to regulator low profit expectations or to avoid small losses, then: 1) discretionary 
accruals (DAT) will have a negative contemporaneous relationship with earnings before 
discretionary accruals (EBDA), and 2) there will be a discontinuity in the earnings distribution of 
firms for ranges around zero profit. This result was first documented by Leone and Van Horn 
(2005). I replicate this test as a first step in my analysis as it is a necessary antecedent to my 
theory regarding the effects of reported charity care on nonprofit hospital earnings management 
behavior. 
Using a pooled sample of nonprofit hospital firms after estimation of discretionary 
accruals (DAT), I estimate the following equation (adapted from Leone and Van Horn, 2005) to 
formally test the relation between EBDA and DAT: 
DATit = λ0t + λ1EBDAit + λ2ROAit -1 +  λ3DATit -1 + εit 
  Results (not separately reported in a Table) for my sample of 1,063 nonprofit hospital 
firm years show that the coefficient on EBDA is negative (-.759) and highly significant (p-value 
<.001). This result provides evidence consistent with nonprofit hospital managers making 
discretionary accrual choices based on their “pre-managed” earnings. However, this test by itself 
does not support a conclusion that nonprofit hospital managers are using discretionary accruals 
to report earnings close to the zero profit benchmark. 
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To determine if results reported in the results I report in the previous paragraph are 
consistent with nonprofit hospital managers managing earnings to report close to zero-profits, I 
separate firms, consistent with Leone and Van Horn (2005) into intervals based on ROA using 
the DeGeorge et al. (1999) method to calculate bin width for the intervals. Using this method I 
determine that the bin width for ROA in my sample is appropriately .02. I then use this as my bin 
width to construct intervals and assign each nonprofit hospital firm year into a bin/interval based 
on its reported ROA. I then compare the actual percentage of firms in each interval to the 
expected percentage of firms in each interval (assuming a normal distribution).  Next, I calculate 
a z-score for the difference between the actual and expected percentages for each interval. A 
statistically significant z-score for a given interval is interpreted as existence of an interval where 
a discontinuity in the actual ROA distribution. Based on an interval width of .02, no statistically 
significant z-sores are observed. While this result seems to suggest no discontinuity in the ROA 
distribution, it is possible that intervals ranging by .02 do not capture the nature of how nonprofit 
hospital firms report ROA to a range acceptable to tax regulators. 
To test whether there is a wider ROA range acceptable to tax regulators, I separate firms 
into intervals based on two times the calculated bin width (i.e., .04). This bin width is more likely 
to capture the positive earnings range acceptable to regulators given that I observe a median 
ROA in my sample of approximately 4%. The results using intervals of .04 reveal that a 
discontinuity in the ROA distribution exists between the interval just before zero-profit (i.e., -.04 
to -.0001) and the interval just after zero-profit (i.e., .00 to .04). The z-score for the difference 
between the actual percentage of firms and the expected percentage of firms is negative for the 
interval -.04 to -.001 and positive for the interval .00 to .04, with both z-scores being significant 
at the .001 level. This result, along with the observed negative and significant relation between 
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EBDA and DAT in the regression I discuss and report above, is materially consistent with prior 
research (i.e., Leone and Van Horn 2005, Eldenburg et al. 2008)) and provides evidence that the 
nonprofit hospitals in my sample manage earnings around a regulator imposed low profit 
constraint. 
 
Effect of Reported Charity Care on Earnings Management 
 H1 predicts that nonprofit hospital firms manage positive earnings toward a zero profit 
less aggressively when their contemporaneously reported charity care is higher than regulator 
expectations. To formally test H1, I first develop a “Charity Care Expectations Model” (i.e., 
CCE Model, Equation 2), to estimate a proxy for the extent nonprofit hospital managers perceive 
they have met (or have not met) regulator expectations regarding the level of charity care 
provided by their hospital. I do so by taking the residual from a regression of reported charity 
care on factors that would likely influence the amount of charity care a nonprofit hospital is 
expected by regulators to provide and report in the current year. The regression results for this 
model are reported in Table 2A. The r-squared for this model is 77%. I also report descriptive 
statistics and Pearson correlations for all variables included in the CCE model in Tables 2B and 
2C, respectively. I then use the residuals (EXPCC) from the regression in my formal test of H1, 
where an EXPCC of zero indicates a hospital has met the regulator expected level of charity 
care, an EXPCC of less than zero measures the extent a hospital has not met regulator 
expectations, and an EXPCC of greater than zero measures the extent a hospital has exceeded 
regulator expectations for current year charity care. The EXPCC variable has a range from -.334 
to .521 with a mean of .000.   
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TABLE 2A  
Descriptive Statistics for Variables in CCE Model (Equation 2) 
Nonprofit Hospital Sample 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
25
th
 
percentile 
50
th
 
percentile 
75
th
 
percentile      
 
CHARITY 0.07 0.10 0.01 0.04 0.08      
TRAU 0.17 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00      
UP 0.21 0.03 0.18 0.19 0.24      
TGR 4.60 2.44 2.77 4.23 6.05      
           
           
 
where: CHARITY = the reported amount of charity care expense by a hospital in year t scaled by total assets in year t-1, TRAU is 
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the OSHPD considers a hospital in year t a hospital with the facilities and personnel to provide care 
for emergency trauma related injuries, UP = the percent of the population that was uninsured during 2006 in the Health Service 
Area (HSA) where a hospital is located, and TGR = the reported amount of total gross revenue in year t divided by total assets in 
year t-1. 
 
 
TABLE 2B 
Results for CCE Model (Equation 2) 
Nonprofit Hospital Sample 
 
Dependent variable = CHARITYit         
   
Variable Coeff SE t-ratio   
Intercept -0.021 0.011 -1.954  
CHARITYit-1 0.920 0.020 45.370 *** 
TRAUit 0.015 0.004 3.662 *** 
UPi 0.044 0.050 0.878  
TGRit 0.006 0.001 8.058 *** 
     
r-squared 76.7%    
n          1,063         
 
* denotes coefficient is significant at the .05 level, **denotes coefficient is significant at the .01 level, 
and ***denotes coefficient is significant at the .001 level. 
 
where: CHARITYit = the reported amount of charity care expense by a hospital in year t scaled by total 
assets in year t-1, CHARITYit-1 = the reported amount of charity care expense by a hospital in year t-1 
divided by total assets in year t-2 , TRAUit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the OSHPD considers a 
hospital in year t a hospital with the facilities and personnel to provide care for emergency trauma 
related injuries, UP i = the percent of the population that was uninsured during 2006 in the Health 
Service Area (HSA) where a hospital is located, and TGRit = the reported amount of total gross revenue 
in year t divided by total assets in year t-1. 
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TABLE 2C 
Pearson Correlations for Variables in CCE Model (Equation 2)  
Nonprofit Hospital Sample 
 
 
  CHARITY CHARITY_PY TRAU 
        
UP 
CHARITY           1    
CHARITY_PY    .867**                   1   
TRAU    .187**             .179**         1  
UP    .121**             .126**   .087**        1 
TGR      .502** .467**  -.089**    .026            
 
* denotes coefficient is significant at the .05 level, **denotes coefficient is significant at the .01 level, and ***denotes coefficient is significant at the 
.001 level. 
 
where: CHARITY = the reported amount of charity care expense by a hospital in year t scaled by total assets in year t-1, CHARITY_PY = the 
reported amount of charity care expense by a hospital in year t-1 divided by total assets in year t-2 , TRAU is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
OSHPD considers a hospital in year t a hospital with the facilities and personnel to provide care for emergency trauma related injuries, UP = the 
percent of the population that was uninsured during 2006 in the Health Service Area (HSA) where a hospital is located, and TGR = the reported 
amount of total gross revenue in year t divided by total assets in year t-1. 
 
 
I then use the EXPCC variable in a regression of Equation (3) to test H1. Specifically, I 
regress DAT on EBDA, lagged ROA, lagged DAT, EXPCC, and the interaction of EXPCC and 
EBDA.  Descriptive statistics and Peason Correlations for variables included in Equations (1) 
and (3), along with other related variables are reported in Tables 3A and 3B, respectively. 
Results from the regression of Equation (3), as reported in Table 4 (labeled as Model 1) support 
H1. Consistent with prior studies and as expected, the coefficient for EBDA is negative and 
significant (-.749, p-value <.001).
13
  The coefficient for EXPCC is significant and positive (.137, 
p-value <.05), suggesting that managers make income increasing accruals when reported charity 
care is higher. However, the EXPCC main effect result alone is not sufficient to conclude 
support for H1. Recall  my prediction in H1 is related to the effect EXPCC has on the 
aggressiveness of nonprofit hospitals to manage EBDA toward zero.  Therefore, the interaction 
between EBDA and EXPCC is the appropriate test variable for my prediction. In support of H1, 
                                                 
13
 Note that EBDA is also negative and significant (-.759, p-value<.001) in the estimation of  the equation used to 
test for earnings management by prior studies (see footnote 11) which does not include EXPCC as an independent 
variable.   
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the interaction between EBDA and EXPCC is positive and significant (.363, p-value <.05), 
indicating that the effect of EBDA on manager discretionary accrual decisions depends on the 
extent reported charity care is above (below) regulator expectations, where charity care above 
(below) regulator expectations decreases (increases) the negative effect of EBDA on 
discretionary accruals. This result suggests that nonprofit hospitals manage positive earnings 
towards zero profit less (more) aggressively when managers perceive they are less (more) 
sensitive to regulatory scrutiny of their reported charity care. 
 
TABLE 3A 
Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Equations (1) and (3) 
Nonprofit Hospital Sample (n=1,063 firm years) 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 25
th
 percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile 
TPA 3.16  1.86  1.78  2.92  4.29  
TPA_CG 0.39  0.61  0.14  0.31  0.56  
TGR 4.60  2.44  2.76  5.53  6.03  
TGR_CG 0.53  0.78  0.22  0.44  0.74  
GRMED 2.84  1.69  1.49  2.51  3.74  
GRMED_CG 0.49  0.69  0.14  0.32  0.69  
DAT 0.00  0.13  (0.06) 0.00  0.04  
EBDA 0.04  0.16  (0.02) 0.06  0.12  
ROA 0.04  0.13  (0.01) 0.05  0.10  
EXPCC 0.00  0.05  (0.02) 0.00  0.01  
 
where: TPA = third party settlement adjustments for year t divided by total assets in year t-1, TPA_CG  = change in third 
party settlement adjustments from year t-1 divided by total assets in year t-1, TGR = total gross patient revenue in year t 
divided by total assets in year t- 1, TGR_CG = change in total gross patient revenue from year t-1 divided by total assets in 
year t-1, GRMED = total gross Medi-cal and Medi-care patient revenue in year t divided by total assets in year t-1, 
GRMED_CG = change in Medi-cal and Medi-care revenue from year t-1 divided by total assets in year t-1, DAT = estimated 
discretionary accruals for year t divided by total assets in year t-1, EBDA  = net income before estimated DAT for year t 
divided by total assets in year t-1, ROA = net income in year t divided by total assets in year t-1, EXPCC  = estimated 
variance to "regulator-expected" charity care (i.e., residual from Equation 2) in year t divided by total assets in year t-1. 
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    TABLE 3B 
Pearson Correlations for Variables in Equations (1) and (3) 
Nonprofit Hospital Sample (n=1,063 firm years) 
 
  
DAT DAT_PY TPA TPA_CG TGR_CG 
GRMED_
CG ROA CHARITY 
CHARITY
_PY EBDA GRMED TGR 
DAT           1            
DAT_PY     .034           1           
TPA    -.037 .109**       1          
TPA_CG  -.226**       .061* .518**         1         
TGR_CG   -.011      .072* .523** .976**      1        
GRMED_CG   -.007 .096** .524** .732** .753** 1       
ROA     .218**     -.074*     .059     .059 .111** .079*       1      
CHARITY     .214**    -.057 .455** .113** .164** .226**    -.022           1     
CHARITY_PY     .109**      -.142** .421**      .068* .094** .177**    -.018 .867**          1    
EBDA    -.639** -.086**       .076* .230** .096**      .068* .612** -.191** -.103**        1   
GRMED   .052      .061* .939** .467** .492** .500**    -.028 .542** .506**     -.064*        1  
TGR     .066*     .035 .979** .504** .532** .522**      .070* .502** .467**    .001 .958** 1 
EXPCC    .244** .104**    -.022    -.024     .036     .036    -.016 .475**       .000 -.230**       .000 .000 
 
* and ** denote correlations significant at the .05 level, and .01 level, respectively. 
 
where: DAT = estimated discretionary accruals for year t divided by total assets in year t-1, DAT_PY = estimated discretionary accruals for year t-1 
divided by total assets in year t-2, TPA = third party settlement adjustments for year t divided by total assets in year t-1, TPA_CG  = change in third 
party settlement adjustments from year t-1 divided by total assets in year t-1, TGR_CG = change in total gross patient revenue from year t-1 divided by 
total assets in year t-1, GRMED_CG = change in Medi-cal and Medi-care revenue from year t-1 divided by total assets in year t-1, EBDA  = earnings 
before estimated DAT for year t divided by total assets in year t-1, ROA = earnings in year t divided by total assets in year t-1, CHARITY = charity care 
for year t divided by total assets in year t-1, CHARITY_PY = charity care for year t-1 divided by total assets in year t-2, GRMED = total gross Medi-cal 
and Medi-care patient revenue in year t divided by total assets in year t-1, TGR = total gross patient revenue in year t divided by total assets in year t- 1, 
and EXPCC is a proxy for the amount of charity care reported by hospital i in year t that is above or below regulator expectations and is the residual for 
hospital i in year t from a regression of actual reported charity care on variables that are associated with how much charity care a hospital is expected to 
provide based on its size, the demographics of its community, etc., as follows:  CHARITYit = α0t + α1CHARITYit-1 + α2TRAUit + α3UPi + εit, where: 
CHARITYit = the reported amount of charity care expense by a hospital in year t scaled by total assets in year t-1, CHARITYit-1 = the reported amount of 
charity care expense by a hospital in year t-1 divided by total assets in year t-2 , TRAUit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the OSHPD considers a 
hospital in year t a hospital with the facilities and personnel to provide care for emergency trauma related injuries, UPi = the percent of the population 
that was uninsured during 2006 in the Health Service Area (HSA) where a hospital is located, and TGRit = the reported amount of total gross revenue in 
year t divided by total assets in year t-1. 
 
 To provide a further test of H1, I estimate an equation that incorporates into Equation (3) 
a dummy variable for EBDA (equal to 1 if EBDA is equal to or above zero) and an interaction of 
the EBDA dummy variable (EBDA_DUMMY) with EXPCC. The equation is as follows: 
DATit = λ0t + λ1EBDAit + λ2ROAit -1 +  λ3DATit -1 + λ4EXPCCit + 
   λ 5EBDA_DUMMYit +λ6EXPCCit* EBDA_DUMMYit + εit (4) 
The results for Equation (4) are also reported in Table 4, (labeled as Model 2). The 
coefficient for EBDA, as in the previous test using Equation (3), is negative and significant (-
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.759, p-value <.001). However, the coefficient for EXPCC becomes insignificant (as opposed to 
the significant EXPCC coefficient in the estimation of Equation 3). The coefficient for 
EBDA_DUMMY is also insignificant.  However, important to my prediction in H1, the 
interaction between EXPCC and EBDA_DUMMY is positive and significant (.413, p-value 
<.001). This result supports H1, and suggests that when EBDA is positive, nonprofit hospitals 
manage earnings upward (downward) when EXPCC is positive (negative). 
 
TABLE 4 
Test of H1 – Effect of Reported Charity Care on Earnings Management 
Nonprofit Hospital Sample 
 
Dependent Variable = DATit                  
  Model 1(Equation 3)  Model 2 (Equation 4)  
Variable Prediction Coeff SE t-ratio   Coeff SE t-ratio   
Intercept ? 0.011 0.003 3.971 ** 0.008 0.006 1.437  
EBDAit - -0.749 0.021 -35.897 *** -0.759 0.026 -29.692 *** 
ROAit-1 ? 0.577 0.029 19.746 *** 0.574 0.029 19.688 *** 
DATit-1 + 0.059 0.020 2.995 * 0.057 0.020 2.888 * 
EXPCCit  + 0.137 0.063 2.176 * -0.070 0.069 -1.003  
EXPCCit x EBDAit + 0.363 0.167 2.177 *     
EBDA_DUMMYit -     0.006 0.008 0.784  
EXPCCit x 
EBDA_DUMMYit +     0.413 0.113 3.638 *** 
          
r-squared  58.0%    58.3%    
n     1,063          1,063        
 
* denotes coefficient is significant at the .05 level, **denotes coefficient is significant at the .01 level, and ***denotes coefficient is significant at 
the .001 level. 
 
where: DATit = discretionary accruals estimated for hospital i in period t scaled by total assets in period t-1, EBDAit = net income before 
discretionary accruals (i.e. “pre-managed earnings”) for hospital i in period t scaled by total assets in period t-1, ROAit = net income for hospital i 
in period t-1 scaled by total assets at the end of period t-2, and DATit-1 = discretionary accruals estimated for hospital i in period t-1 scaled by total 
assets in period t-2 is included to control for the first-order autocorrelation in discretionary accruals, and EXPCCit is a proxy for the amount of 
charity care reported by hospital i in year t that is above or below regulator expectations and is the residual for hospital i in year t from a 
regression of actual reported charity care on variables that are associated with how much charity care a hospital is expected to provide based on 
its size, the demographics of its community, etc.,14 as follows: 
 
CHARITYit = α0t + α1CHARITYit-1 + α2TRAUit + α3UPi + εit    
where: CHARITYit = the reported amount of charity care expense by a hospital in year t scaled by total assets in year t-1, CHARITYit-1 = the 
reported amount of charity care expense by a hospital in year t-1 divided by total assets in year t-2 , TRAUit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
OSHPD considers a hospital in year t a hospital with the facilities and personnel to provide care for emergency trauma related injuries, UPi = the 
percent of the population that was uninsured during 2006 in the Health Service Area (HSA) where a hospital is located, and TGRit = the reported 
amount of total gross revenue in year t divided by total assets in year t-1. 
                                                 
14
 Results for this model are reported in Table 3B. 
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Supplemental Analysis – Ruling Out Alternative Explanations for Nonprofit Results 
 While the results I report in the above section support H1, it is possible the results I 
observe regarding the relationship between EXPCC, EBDA, and DAT (which is estimated using 
the changes in the TPA liability account), all of which are correlated with total gross revenue, 
can be alternatively explained by the mechanical relationship between these variables. Also, 
there may be factors related to the hospital industry and/or the business, economic, and reporting 
environment in California that may alternatively explain the results I observe for my nonprofit 
hospital sample. To rule out these alternative explanations and validate that my results are more 
likely explained by the theory I use to motivate H1, I compare the earnings management 
behavior of nonprofit hospitals to that of for-profit hospitals also reporting to the OSHPD in 
California during my sample years.   
Because for-profit hospitals are not under regulatory pressure to report near zero-profits 
and certain levels of charity care (because they are tax paying entities with no risk of losing tax 
exemptions) they likely have a different objective function in regards to the association between 
reported profits and reported charity care. Consistent with my nonprofit results, and because of 
the likely mechanical relationship between charity care and discretionary accruals (i.e. higher 
amounts of charity care likely affect a hospitals‟ need to manage earnings upward to report 
positive net income or meet certain earnings‟ benchmarks), I expect EXPCC to have a positive 
and significant main effect on discretionary accruals. However, and unlike my prediction for 
nonprofit hospitals, I do not expect for-profit hospitals‟ to manage earnings upwards away from 
zero profit more (less) aggressively to the extent EXPCC is positive (negative). More 
specifically, I do not expect a positive and significant interaction between EBDA and EXPCC or 
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between EBDA and EXPCC.
15
 To test my expectations, I estimate regressions of Equations (1) 
through (4) using my for-profit hospital sample and compare the results to those I observe for my 
nonprofit hospital sample. 
Recall that my first test of H1 in Equation (3) regresses DAT on EBDA, lagged ROA, 
lagged DAT, EXPCC, and the interaction of EXPCC and EBDA. The results of Equation (3) for 
the for-profit hospital sample are reported in Table 5 (labeled as Model 1). The coefficient for 
EBDA is negative and significant (-.194, p-value <.001) and the coefficient for EXPCC is 
positive and significant (.573, p-value <.001). These results are consistent with my expectations 
and similar to the results reported for the nonprofit hospital sample. However, as also expected, 
the interaction between EBDA and EXPCC for the for-profit sample is not positive and 
significant. In fact the coefficient for this interaction is negative and significant (-.903, p-
value<.001). This result is the opposite of the results for the nonprofit sample and suggests that 
for-profit hospitals do not manage earnings via discretionary accruals upward away from zero 
more aggressively when they are in conformance with regulator expectations for their reported 
level of charity care. Furthermore, the results for the for-profit sample using Equation (4), which 
includes a dummy variable for EBDA (i.e., EBDA_DUMMY, =  to 1 if EBDA is positive) and 
an interaction term of EBDA_DUMMY with EXPCC, suggests for-profit hospital managers‟ 
decisions to manage either positive or negative earnings before accruals do not depend on their 
conformance with regulator-expected levels of charity care. As expected, and unlike the my 
results for nonprofit hospitals, the coefficient for the interaction between EBDA_DUMMY and 
                                                 
15
 It is possible that for-profit hospitals are under some degree of normative pressure to appear “charitable” relative 
to their reported income.  However, I do not expect such behavior to be systematic because the commitments and 
incentives of for-profit firms to meet such expectations instead of reporting higher positive income to their 
stakeholders likely varies across hospitals. 
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EXPCC in the for-profit sample, as reported in Table 5 (labeled as Model 2) is not significant (-
.192, p-value =.473).  
Therefore, given these key differences in the results between the nonprofit and for-profit 
hospital samples, I conclude that my results for nonprofit hospitals are most likely explained by 
the theory I use to motivate H1. The differences in the results between my nonprofit and for-
profit samples provide evidence that the nonprofit results I report are not driven by the 
mechanical relationship between the empirical test variables in my models, and/or the specific 
reporting and economic environment for all hospitals reporting to the OSHPD in California. 
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TABLE 5 
Supplemental Analysis - Model Results for Sample of For-profit Hospitals (Equations 3&4) 
 
Dependent Variable = DATit                  
  Model 1(Equation 3) Model 2(Equation 4) 
Variable Prediction Coeff SE t-ratio   Coeff SE t-ratio   
Intercept ? -0.010 0.018 -0.551  0.199 0.029 6.824 *** 
EBDAit - -0.194 0.017 -11.217 *** -0.030 0.009 -3.161 * 
ROAit-1 ? -0.075 0.073 -1.036  -0.049 0.076 -0.639  
DATit-1 + 0.267 0.043 6.272 *** 0.244 0.044 5.587 *** 
EXPCCit  + 0.573 0.131 4.366 *** 0.741 0.199 3.730 *** 
EXPCCit x EBDAit ? -0.903 0.089 -10.186 ***     
EBDA_DUMMYit ?     -0.344 0.040 -8.617 *** 
EXPCCit x 
EBDA_DUMMYit ?     -0.192 0.268 -0.719  
          
r-squared  29.9%    26.6%    
n        544        544       
 
* denotes coefficient is significant at the .05 level, **denotes coefficient is significant at the .01 level, and ***denotes coefficient is significant at 
the .001 level. 
 
where: DATit = discretionary accruals estimated for hospital i in period t scaled by total assets in period t-1, EBDAit = net income before 
discretionary accruals (i.e. “pre-managed earnings”) for hospital i in period t scaled by total assets in period t-1, ROAit = net income for hospital i 
in period t-1 scaled by total assets at the end of period t-2, and DATit-1 = discretionary accruals estimated for hospital i in period t-1 scaled by total 
assets in period t-2 is included to control for the first-order autocorrelation in discretionary accruals, and EXPCCit is a proxy for the amount of 
charity care reported by hospital i in year t that is above or below regulator expectations and is the residual for hospital i in year t from a 
regression of actual reported charity care on variables that are associated with how much charity care a hospital is expected to provide based on 
its size, the demographics of its community, etc.,16 as follows: 
 
CHARITYit = α0t + α1CHARITYit-1 + α2TRAUit + α3UPi + εit    
 
where: CHARITYit = the reported amount of charity care expense by a hospital in year t scaled by total assets in year t-1, CHARITYit-1 = the 
reported amount of charity care expense by a hospital in year t-1 divided by total assets in year t-2 , TRAUit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
OSHPD considers a hospital in year t a hospital with the facilities and personnel to provide care for emergency trauma related injuries, UPi = the 
percent of the population that was uninsured during 2006 in the Health Service Area (HSA) where a hospital is located, and TGRit = the reported 
amount of total gross revenue in year t divided by total assets in year t-1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16
 Results of this model (i.e., the “CCE Model”) for the for-profit sample are not reported formally in this 
manuscript. 
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Robustness Check – Effect of Reported Charity Care Using Alternative Model 
Recall that to formally test H1, I first develop a “Charity Care Expectations Model” (i.e., CCE 
Model, Equation 2), to estimate a proxy for the extent nonprofit hospital managers perceive they 
have met (or have not met) regulator expectations regarding the level of charity care provided by 
their hospital. I do so by taking the residual from a regression of reported charity care on factors 
that would likely influence the amount of charity care a nonprofit hospital is expected by 
regulators to provide. This residual (i.e., EXPCC) is then included in Equations 3 and 4 to test 
H1. To explore whether my results for H1 are robust to an alternative measure of EXPCC 
(hereafter referred to as EXPCC_A), I add additional control variables to the CCE Model 
specification.  Like the independent variables included in the original CCE Model (Equation 2), 
the added control variables are also possible determinants of regulator expectations of a hospital 
charity care.  The added control variables are as follows: 
 
GRMEDit is a proxy for payer mix and equal to the reported amount of total Medi-Care and 
Medi-Cal
17
 revenue by hospital i in year t scaled by total assets in year t-1. The profitability for 
patients with government payers such as Medi-Care and Medi-Cal is likely lower because they 
pay at lower rates than other third-party payers (Eldenburg and Krishnan 2003). Therefore, the 
portion of the total charges a patient is responsible for is likely to be greater for Medi-Care and 
Medi-Cal patients than patients with other third-party payers. Hospitals with greater amounts of 
revenue associated with government payers should, therefore, have higher average per-patient 
charges that are unrecoverable, which could lead to higher numbers of charity cases. 
 
                                                 
17
 Medi-Cal refers to revenue and expenses for patients covered by a State of California funding administration, 
similar to that of the federal Medi-Care administration, which supplements private insurance for low income 
individuals. 
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YEARit… are dummy variables included in the model for all firm years during the sample period. 
This variable is included to proxy for general economic and business conditions that may effect 
the level of charity care provided by all hospitals in California during a specific reporting year. 
 
PPi like UP, can also proxy for a hospital‟s geographical market demand for charity care and 
equal to the percent of the population with income below 200% of the poverty level in the HSA 
where hospital i is located. Since it is possible for someone to have insurance coverage but still 
be unable to pay their portion of hospital charges, I include this variable as an additional proxy 
for charity care demand within a hospital‟s market area. Further, prior studies document a 
negative relationship between income levels in hospital market areas and levels of charity care 
reported (Hassan et al., 2000, Clement et al., 2002).   
 
BEDit is a proxy for hospital size and is equal to the total number of licensed and available beds 
for hospital i in year t. Hospitals with larger facilities and capacity available for providing 
inpatient medical services would be able to provide a greater amount of charity care. Further, 
prior studies find a positive relationship between licensed beds and charity care (e.g., Morrisey et 
al., 1996). 
 
ALOSit is equal to the average number of days for which patients receiving inpatient care 
occupied a bed in hospital i in year t. ALOS can influence hospital performance in a number of 
ways (Link, 1995). ALOS likely captures the average severity of cases among inpatients and 
should be positively related to the average charges per patient.   
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DTOTit is the total number of days for which all patients receiving inpatient care occupied beds 
in hospital i in year t and should be positively related to number of charity care cases for a 
hospital. 
 
DMEDit is a equal to the total number of days for which Medi-Care and Medi-Cal patients 
receiving inpatient care occupied a bed in hospital i in year t. I include this variable as an 
additional proxy for payer mix since I also include the total number of days for all patients (i.e., 
DTOT) in my model.  
 
DISit is the total number of patient discharges by hospital i in year t and should be positively 
related to the number of charity care cases for a hospital. 
 
TEACHit is a proxy for case severity and equal to 1 if hospital i in year t is labeled as a teaching 
hospital in the OSHPD database. Prior research finds that teaching hospitals provide for charity 
care than non-teaching hospitals (Thorpe and Phelps, 1991). 
 
SMALLit is a proxy for size and geographical market demand for charity care and equal to 1 if 
hospital i in year t is labeled as a small or rural hospital in the OSHPD database. Hospitals small 
in size and in rural areas likely face less competition in their markets and often treat 
disproportionately large shares of uninsured patients (Eldenburg et al., 2009). 
 
After including the additional control variables listed above in the original CCE Model (i.e., 
Equation 2), the alternative CCE model is as follows: 
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CHARITYit = α0t + α1TGRit + α2GRMEDit + α3YEARit… + α4UPit + α5PPit + α6BEDit + 
α7TRAUit + α8ALOSit + α9DATOTit +  α10DMEDit + α11ALOSit +  α12DISTit + α13TEACH it +  
α14SMALLit + α15CHARITY it-1  + εit 
Recall that to formally test H1 I estimate a regressions of Equations (3) and (4). 
Specifically, I regress DAT on EBDA, lagged ROA, lagged DAT, EXPCC, and the interaction of 
EXPCC and EBDA (in Equation 3), and the interaction of EXPCC and EBDA_DUMMY (in 
Equation 4).  The results from these tests are discussed in the previous sub-section titled “Effect 
of Reported Charity Care on Earnings Management” and are reported in Table 4. To determine 
whether the results I observe in my formal test of H1 are robust to an alternative measurement of 
EXPCC (i.e., EXPCC_A) I calculate EXPCC_A as the residual from the alternative CCE Model 
described above.  Descriptive statistics and the results for the alternative CCE Model are shown 
in Tables 6A and 6B, respectively.   
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Table 6A  
Robustness Check 
Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Alternative CCE Model  
Nonprofit Hospital Sample 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
25
th
 
percentile 
50
th
 
percentile 
75
th
 
percentile      
CHARITY 0.07 0.10 0.01 0.04 0.08      
TGR 4.60 2.44 2.77 4.23 6.05      
GRMED 2.84 1.69 1.51 2.51 3.79      
UP 0.21 0.03 0.18 0.19 0.24      
PP 0.34 0.07 0.26 0.36 0.39      
BED 243 167 109 217 334      
TRAU 0.19 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00      
ALOS 4.52 1.28 3.90 4.40 5.00      
DTOT 58725 45758 22178 51038 82854      
DMED 39758 29854 15944 33968 56325      
DIST 11029 8199 4130 10027 15939      
TEACH 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00      
SMALL 0.16 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00      
           
 
where: CHARITY = the reported amount of charity care expense by a hospital in year t scaled by total assets in year t-1, TGR = 
the reported amount of total gross revenue in year t divided by total assets in year t-1, GRMED = the reported amount of total 
Medi-Care and Medi-Cal revenue by a hospital in year t divided by total assets in year t-1, UP = the percent of the population that 
was uninsured during 2006 in the Health Service Area (HSA) where a hospital is located, PP = the percent of the population with 
income below 200% of the poverty level during 2006 in the HSA where a hospital is located, BED = the total number of licensed 
and available beds for a hospital in year t, TRAU is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the OSHPD considers a hospital in year t a 
hospital with the facilities and personnel to provide care for emergency trauma related injuries, ALOS = the average number of 
days for which patients receiving inpatient care occupied a bed in a hospital in year t, DTOT = the total number of days for which 
all patients receiving inpatient care occupied a bed in a hospital in year t, DMED = the total number of days for which Medi-Care 
and Medi-Cal patients receiving inpatient care occupied a bed in a hospital in year t, DIS = the total number of patient discharges 
by a hospital in year t, TEACH = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a hospital in year t is labeled as a teaching hospital in the OSHPD 
database, SMALL = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a hospital in year t is labeled as a small or rural hospital in the OSHPD 
database 
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TABLE 6B 
Robustness Check - Results for Alternative CCE Model (Equation 5) 
Nonprofit Hospital Sample 
 
Dependent variable = CHARITYt         
   
Variable Coeff SE t-ratio   
Intercept -0.010 0.014 -0.713  
TGRt -0.003 0.003 -1.124  
GRMEDt 0.014 0.004 3.278 *** 
UP 0.005 0.005 0.991  
PP 0.006 0.005 1.042  
YEAR_2004 0.011 0.005 1.985 * 
YEAR_2005 0.000 0.005 -0.007  
YEAR_2006 0.000 0.005 0.070  
YEAR_2007 0.048 0.059 0.815  
YEAR_2008 -0.022 0.025 -0.851  
BEDt 0.000 0.000 -0.488  
TRAUt 0.018 0.005 3.536 *** 
ALOSt -0.001 0.001 -0.966  
DATOTt 0.000 0.000 -0.627  
DMEDt 0.000 0.000 0.386  
DISTt 0.000 0.000 1.167  
TEACHt 0.010 0.007 1.470  
SMALLt 0.003 0.005 0.523  
CHARITYt-1 0.891 0.022 39.789 *** 
     
r-squared 77.5%    
n          1,063        
 
* denotes coefficient is significant at the .05 level, **denotes coefficient is significant at the .01 level, 
and ***denotes coefficient is significant at the .001 level. 
 
where: CHARITYt = the reported amount of charity care expense by a hospital in year t scaled by total 
assets in year t-1, TGRt = the reported amount of total gross revenue in year t divided by total assets in 
year t-1, GRMEDt = the reported amount of total Medi-Care and Medi-Cal revenue by a hospital in year 
t divided by total assets in year t-1, YEAR_... variables represent dummy variables included in the 
model for all firm years during the sample period, UP = the percent of the population that was uninsured 
during 2006 in the Health Service Area (HSA) where a hospital is located, PP = the percent of the 
population with income below 200% of the poverty level during 2006 in the HSA where a hospital is 
located, BEDt = the total number of licensed and available beds for a hospital in year t, TRAUt is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the OSHPD considers a hospital in year t a hospital with the facilities and 
personnel to provide care for emergency trauma related injuries, ALOSt = the average number of days 
for which patients receiving inpatient care occupied a bed in a hospital in year t, DTOTt = the total 
number of days for which all patients receiving inpatient care occupied a bed in a hospital in year t, 
DMEDt = the total number of days for which Medi-Care and Medi-Cal patients receiving inpatient care 
occupied a bed in a hospital in year t, DISt = the total number of patient discharges by a hospital in year 
t, TEACHt = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a hospital in year t is labeled as a teaching hospital in the 
OSHPD database, SMALLt = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a hospital in year t is labeled as a small or 
rural hospital in the OSHPD database, and CHARITYit-1 = the reported amount of charity care expense 
by a hospital in year t-1 divided by total assets in year t-2 
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I then use the EXPCC_A in the formal tests of H1 (i.e., Equations 3 and 4).  Results from 
this robustness check are reported in Table 7 and are consistent with the results reported in Table 
4 for Equations 3 and 4 using my originally estimated EXPCC variable. Consistent with the 
results from my original tests of H1, the coefficient for EXPCC_A is significant and positive, 
EBDA is negative and significant, and the interactions between EBDA and EXPCC_A (in 
Equation 3) and EBDA_DUMMY and EXPCC_A (in Equation 4) are both positive and 
significant. These results are consistent with my original tests of H1, and likewise suggest that 
when EBDA is positive, nonprofit hospital managers manage earnings upward (downward) when 
reported charity care is higher (lower) than regulator expectations. 
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TABLE 7 
Robustness Check 
Test of H1 - Using EXPCC Variable from Alternative CCE Model 
Nonprofit Hospital Sample 
 
Dependent Variable = DATt                  
  Model 1(Equation 3)  Model 2 (Equation 4)  
Variable Prediction Coeff SE t-ratio   Coeff SE t-ratio   
Intercept ? 0.007 0.003 2.661 ** 0.006 0.005 0.855  
EBDAt - -0.725 0.021 -34.205 *** -0.734 0.026 -27.785 *** 
ROAt-1 ? 0.592 0.029 20.359 *** 0.588 0.029 20.308 *** 
DATt-1 + 0.035 0.020 1.737  0.034 0.020 1.680 * 
EXPCCt  + 0.200 0.061 3.299 ** 0.009 0.069 0.124  
EXPCCt x EBDAt + 0.342 0.162 2.113 *     
EBDA_DUMMY -     0.005 0.008 0.690  
EXPCCt x EBDA_DUMMY +     0.376 0.110 3.425 ** 
          
r-squared  58.1%    58.5%    
n     1,063          1,063        
 
* denotes coefficient is significant at the .05 level, **denotes coefficient is significant at the .01 level, and ***denotes coefficient is significant at 
the .001 level. 
 
where: DATt = discretionary accruals estimated for hospital i in period t scaled by total assets in period t-1, EBDAt = net income before 
discretionary accruals (i.e. “pre-managed earnings”) for hospital i in period t scaled by total assets in period t-1, ROAt = net income for hospital i 
in period t-1 scaled by total assets at the end of period t-2, and DATt-1 = discretionary accruals estimated for hospital i in period t-1 scaled by total 
assets in period t-2 is included to control for the first-order autocorrelation in discretionary accruals, and EXPCCt is a proxy for the amount of 
charity care reported by hospital i in year t that is above or below regulator expectations and is the residual for hospital i in year t from a 
regression of actual reported charity care on variables that are associated with how much charity care a hospital is expected to provide based on 
its size, the demographics of its community, etc.,
18
 as follows: 
 
CHARITYit = α0t + α1TGRit + α2GRMEDit + α3YEARit… + α4UPi + α5PPi + α6BEDit + α7TRAUit + α8ALOSit + α9DATOTit +  α10DMEDit  +  
α11DISTit + α12TEACH it +  α13SMALLit + α14CHARITY it-1  + εit    
where: CHARITYit = the reported amount of charity care expense by hospital i in year t, TGRit = the reported amount of total gross revenue by 
hospital i in year t, GRMEDit = the reported amount of total Medi-Care and Medi-Cal revenue by hospital i in year t, YEARit represents dummy 
variables included in the model for all years during the sample period, UPi = the percent of the population that was uninsured during 2006 in the 
Health Service Area (HSA) where hospital i is located, PPi = the percent of the population with income below 200% of the poverty level during 
2006 in the HSA where hospital i is located, BEDit = the total number of licensed and available beds for hospital i in year t, TRAUit is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the OSHPD considers hospital i in year t a hospital with the facilities and personnel to provide care for emergency trauma 
related injuries, ALOSit = the average number of days for which patients receiving inpatient care occupied a bed in hospital i in year t, DTOTit = 
the total number of days for which all patients receiving inpatient care occupied a bed in hospital i in year t, DMEDit = the total number of days 
for which Medi-Care and Medi-Cal patients receiving inpatient care occupied a bed in hospital i in year t, DISit = the total number of patient 
discharges by hospital i in year t, TEACHit = a dummy variable equal to 1 if hospital i in year t is labeled as a teaching hospital in the OSHPD 
database, SMALLit = a dummy variable equal to 1 if hospital i in year t is labeled as a small or rural hospital in the OSHPD database, and 
CHARITYit-1 = the reported amount of charity care expense by hospital i in year t-1 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
18
 Results for this model are reported in Table 6B. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
My study provides insight regarding the effect on reporting decisions when tensions 
between firms‟ regulatory concerns and managers‟ incentives to manage earnings exist. More 
specifically, I examine the effects of these tensions on the earnings management behavior of 
nonprofit hospitals. Prior research (i.e., Leone and Van Horn, 2005; Eldenburg et al., 2008) 
provides evidence that nonprofit hospital managers manage reported earnings to a range just 
above zero profit in order to conform to regulator low or zero profit constraints. I extend this 
research by investigating how another reported accounting measure important to regulators, (i.e., 
charity care), affects nonprofit hospital manager decisions to manage earnings toward regulator 
low profit expectations. Results suggest that nonprofit hospital managers alter their conformance 
to regulatory constraints on one dimension (i.e., ROA within an acceptable range above zero 
profit), depending on whether they are able to show conformance to regulatory expectations on 
another dimension (i.e., level of charity care provided).  
Before investigating the affects of reported charity care on managers‟ earnings 
management behavior, I first replicate results of prior research (Leone and Van Horn, 2005) and 
document that, ceteris paribus, nonprofit hospitals use discretionary accruals to manage earnings 
to a range just above zero profit. I then predict that nonprofit hospital managers use discretionary 
accruals to manage positive earnings toward regulator low profit constraints less aggressively 
when reported performance on charity care is favorable to (i.e., higher than) regulator 
expectations. The intuition behind this prediction is that managers can benefit from reporting 
higher earnings (via higher profit-based compensation and/or enhanced reputations for 
operational efficiency) however they must balance this against the costs of regulatory scrutiny. 
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Results are consistent with my prediction. My results also complement prior research, which 
finds that tax regulators attend to both a nonprofit‟s earnings variance to zero-profit and the level 
of reported charity care (i.e., Wilicki, 2001; Barniv et al., 2005). My results suggest that 
nonprofit hospital managers‟ are aware of this and respond strategically when making earnings 
mangement decisions. 
Finally, to validate that my results are appropriately explained by my theory, I compare 
the earnings management behavior of nonprofit hospitals to that of investor owned, for-profit 
hospitals. The results of this analysis provide evidence that nonprofit hospitals‟ earnings 
management behavior is more likely explained by the effects of regulatory pressures to report 
low profits and high levels of charity care alternatively by the mechanical relationship between 
my empirical test variables or by factors related to the more general operating conditions, 
reporting environment, and economic factors affecting the hospitals in California during my 
sample years. 
My study contributes to the economics-based literature stream that examines the effects 
of stakeholder pressures on nonprofit managers‟ operational and reporting decisions (e.g., Jegers 
and Houtman, 1993; Eldenburg and Krishnan, 2003, 2008; Eldenburg and Vines, 2004; 
Krishnan, 2005; Leone and Van Horn 2005; Krishnan and Yetman, 2009). Specifically, I extend 
upon prior evidence that nonprofit hospitals manage reported earnings in order to conform to 
regulator low profit expectations (Leone and Van Horn, 2005). I provide new evidence 
suggesting that the earnings management behavior of nonprofit hospitals is further explained by 
their level of conformance to regulator expectations on another reported accounting measure, 
(i.e., charity care). My study suggests that, when multiple measures of performance are important 
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to stakeholders, nonprofit managers make strategic reporting decisions so as to satisfy 
stakeholder expectations while also maximizing firm surplus and their personal benefits. 
My study also contributes to the positive accounting research literature that investigates 
firms‟ use of earnings management to reduce or avoid political and regulatory costs (e.g., Jones, 
1991; Cahan, 1992; Mensah et al., 1994; Key, 1997; Patten and Trompeter, 2003). This literature 
suggests firms manage earnings downward when they are vulnerable to significant political 
scrutiny and unfavorable regulation. The results of my study suggest that such firms‟ are likely to 
manage earnings downward less aggressively when their reported performance on other 
politically important measures are favorable to policymaker and regulator expectations. 
Finally, my study contributes to the debate over whether nonprofit hospital behavior is 
consistent with the socially accepted, and regulator imposed, objective function for nonprofit 
firms. My study suggests that manager incentives for reporting higher profits and opposing 
regulatory pressures to report lower profits lead to nonprofit hospitals strategically manipulating 
reported earnings upward when they are able to avoid regulatory scrutiny via reporting higher 
levels of charity care. As such, regulators may be their basing tax exemption decisions on 
misleading accounting reports. Furthermore, the direction of future legislation regarding the role 
of nonprofit hospitals in the U.S. healthcare industry could be misguided if policymakers use 
these misleading accounting reports to assess the efficiency of having a mixture of both nonprofit 
and for-profit hospitals competing in the same markets.  
My study is timely given the economic significance of nonprofit hospitals (which 
currently account for the majority of hospitals) in the United States and the recent healthcare 
system reform debate among lawmakers and the American public. In fact, the recently enacted 
2010 Healthcare Reform Bill (HRB) imposes new federal level requirements for nonprofit 
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hospitals regarding provisions of community benefits (which include charity care) and reporting 
requirements similar to those currently imposed in California. The HRB also requires the IRS to 
review the tax-exempt status of all nonprofit hospitals every three years. The results of my study 
suggest that, if the new federal regulations impose added regulatory pressures to report low 
profits high levels of charity care, nonprofit hospitals may be even more likely to manage their 
reported earnings. 
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APPENDIX A 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
ALOS =  average number of days for which patients receiving inpatient care occupied a bed in 
hospital i in year t 
 
BED =  total number of licensed and available beds for hospital i in year t 
 
CHARITY = charity care for year t divided by total assets in year t-1 
 
DAT =  estimated discretionary accruals for year t divided by total assets in year t-1 
 
DIS =  total number of patient discharges by hospital i in year t 
 
DMED =  total number of days for which Medi-Care and Medi-Cal patients receiving inpatient 
care occupied a bed in hospital i in year t 
 
DTOT =  total number of days for which all patients receiving inpatient care occupied a bed in 
hospital i in year t 
 
EBDA  =  net income before estimated DAT for year t divided by total assets in year t-1 
 
EXPCC  =  estimated variance to "regulator-expected" charity care (i.e., residual from CCE 
Model) in year t divided by total assets in year t-1 
 
GRMED =  total gross Medi-cal and Medi-care patient revenue in year t divided by total assets 
in year t-1 
 
PP =  % of the population with income below 200% of the poverty level during 2006 in 
the Health Service Area (HSA) where hospital i is located 
 
ROA =  net income in year t divided by total assets in year t-1 
 
SMALL =  1 if hospital i in year t is labeled as a small or rural, 0 otherwise 
 
TEACH =  1 if hospital i in year t is labeled as a teaching hospital, 0 otherwise 
 
TGR =  total gross patient revenue in year t divided by total assets in year t- 1 
 
TPA =  third party settlement adjustments for year t divided by total assets in year t-1 
 
TRAU =  1 if  hospital i in year t  can treat emergency trauma related injuries, 0 otherwise 
 
UP =  % of the population that was uninsured during 2006 in the Health Service Area 
(HSA) where hospital i is located 
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